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Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judg-
ments: A Historical - Critical Analysis*
Arthur Lenhofft
The vexing problem of reciprocity starts with the question:
Why reciprocity? The question anticipates, of course, the exist-
ence of a clear concept of reciprocity. The difficulty with this
question lies in the fact that reciprocity presents a broad general
idea rather than a definite concept. However, any survey of its
countless instances leads to the conclusion that their common
characteristic points to a certain relation between a course of
conduct of a person or persons or groups of persons and that
of another person or other persons or groups. Among the groups,
the States are, of course, the most important ones. And while the
idea of reciprocity may still have some significance for the
understanding of interesting legal phenomena within a State,
that is, for questions of municipal law,1 it is the fundamental
basis of international law.
I
An independent State has exclusive jurisdiction in and over
its territory, that is, it has territorial sovereignty. The conduct
of a State may affect corresponding rights or interests of other
States. As far as the rights of the latter are concerned their
corollary are the international duties of the former.2 The iden-
tity of the duties imposed upon every State eliminates any ele-
ment of inequality, for the principle of sovereign equality3 is
maintained by virtue of the equality in the limitations placed by
equal duties upon each sovereign. Certainly, there is no interna-
*This study is based in part on an address "The Vexing Problem of Reci-
procity," given by the author on May 19, 1955, at the meeting of the American
Foreign Law Aisociation in New York.
tProfessor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. See Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L.
REV. 619-22 (1954).
2. In Island of Palmas Case (United States and The Netherlands), 2 UNITED
NATIONS REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 829, 839 (Permanent
Court of Arbitration 1928), Arbitrator Max Huber states: "This right has as corol-
lary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States,
in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together
with the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory."
3. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
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tional authority to enforce duties by way of legal process. 4 How-
ever, the interest in the performance of the duties is under the
strongest guaranty, namely, that of reciprocity. A violation of
duties imposed by international law might lead to reprisals which
exemplify another function of the concept of reciprocity. 5 Thus,
a violation of diplomatic immunity may lead to the seizure of
private property of nationals of the offending State. It appears,
therefore, that reprisals are acts which are illegal in nature, but
are recognized by international law as a lawful reaction of one
State to actions committed by a foreign government in violation
of international duties. Acts of reprisals are, therefore, sanctions
for the commission of a wrongful act. Of necessity, interna-
tional law permits them in the absence of a law-enforcing in-
ternational agency; such a sanction is an appropriate method of
self-help to which a Member or Members of the international
community whose rights were violated by the delinquent Member
Anay resort in order to obtain redress for the unlawful act.
Where the attitude of a State without being wrongful hurts
the political, economic, or social interests of another State,
measures of r6torsion taken by the latter against the former
point to another facet of the reciprocity concept. What is in
question is nothing else than an undesirable policy of a State
expressed in legislative acts such as discriminatory restrictions
on aliens or discriminatory tariffs or taxes or unfair admin-
istrative acts such as an unfriendly or even obstructive treat-
ment of immigrants who are nationals of a certain State. Such a
policy may induce the latter State to retaliate with similar or
other unfriendly or discriminatory legislative or administrative
measures against the subjects of the former State, measures
which likewise are not illegal, but objectionable from the stand-
point of the interests of that State.0 By using such lawful but
not amicable measures the other State makes a psychological
attempt to persuade the government of the former to change its
policy which amounts, of course, to a change of its law.
4. The International Court of Justice is not an institution of general inter-
national law; for its jurisdiction is compulsory and obligatory only where it is so
-determined in treaties or by reason of the so-called "Optional Clause" provided for
in article 36 of the Statute of the Court, binding also only upon those States who
so choose. Cf. 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1952).
5. For details, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea,
49 Nw. U.L. REV. 619, 627 (1954).
6. Id. at 629.
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II
As an illustration, cognate to the topic of this study, the
-attitude of a State to international judicial assistance may show
the practical significance of that kind of retaliation. The term,
coined,7 in the absence of an official English terminology (which
exists in .other languages"), designates the aid rendered by one
nation to another in support of judicial or quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings in the recipient country's tribunals,9 such as the pro-
curing of evidence, especially testimony of witnesses in an ac-
tion pending in such a tribunal, or the service of judicial docu-
ments in a foreign country. 10 It may include the treatment of
foreign litigants on the same footing as nationals with respect
to such matters as relief from posting security for costs, or the
granting of legal aid in conducting litigation by exempting a
"poor party" from paying court fees, including fees of witnesses
and experts, and even by procuring assistance of counsel whom,
often, the court appoints.
The activities of the State which is requested to take evi-
dence from a witness upon letters rogatory or to serve summons
upon a party residing there amount to the cooperation in pro-
ceedings pending in a court of the requesting State. Those ac-
tivities are carried out only upon the request of an organ of the
foreign government. Furthermore, the business requested of the
State is merely accessory to and dependent on the principal ac-
tion which is conducted in the other State.
Either feature points to the difference between such acts
properly classified as acts of assistance on the one hand, and
those involving the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments on the other. With respect to the latter, we have to
7. The name is used by Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953). REPORT OF COMMIT-
TEE ON INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION, PROCEEDIiN(IS OF SECTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1950) speaks
of international procedures. The Harvard Research in International Law, which
had worked out a Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 15 (1939), along with an excellent comment, uses, as the title indicates, the
term "judicial assistance."
8. France: Entr'aide (in legal writings the words commission rogatoire are
preferred) ; Italy: Assistenza giudiziaria.
9. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
10. In 1924 the League of Nations had inaugurated a study by a commission
of experts on the problem which led to the report of the late Professor Schiicking.
See LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS [A.15(4).19271. Cf. CUCINOTTA, L'ASSIST-
ENZA GIUDIZIARIA NEI RAPPORT] INTERNAZIONALI (1935).
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distinguish between the State of the forum, that is, the State
in which a foreign judgment is to be enforced, and the State
of rendition, that is, the State whose judicial tribunal rendered
the judgment. Obviously, the task which the forum has to per-
form is not only in substance a different one from that with
which a court originally rendering a decision is faced; but is
also entirely independent from that foreign procedure."' For the
forum, the proceeding involving a determination on the effects
to be given a foreign judgment is a purely domestic action; its
scope and termination is by no means prescribed or limited by
a foreign authority. Taking the full measure of this analysis of
an enforcement procedure as an entirely independent one which
is a domestic action in the forum from its inception to the final
determination, it might be proper to say that the difference in
the origin of the judgment, whether foreign or non-foreign, does
not count for anything as far as the character of the procedure
as an exclusively domestic one is concerned. In giving effect
to a judgment rendered abroad the forum does not lend any
assistance to an adequate performance of its function by a for-
eign judiciary; it fulfills a task of its own in a proceeding not
brought to it from abroad. 12
It is much easier to grasp the nature of legal assistance to
foreign proceedings than the conceptual and functional distinc-
tion which must be drawn between such assistance and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.1 8 However,
11. See, e.g., 4 NEUMEYER, INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNOSRECHT 354, 362
(1936).
12. Another difference, although of minor significance, lies in the fact that
legal assistance is not necessarily a manifestation of judicial power. The requested
state may, for example, permit the taking of evidence before a commissioner or
counsel. By contrast the enforcement of a judgment is necessarily a judicial act.
Cf. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION, PROCEED-
INGS OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE Liw, AMERrCAN BAR As-
SOCIATiON 49 (1950).
13. It was not without good reason that Harvard Research in International
Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 Am. J. INT L L. SuPP. 15
(1939), had come to the conclusion that the two subjects call for a separate treat-
ment. Whereas as a result of the negotiations at the first and second Conferences
at The Hague on Private International Law in 1893 and 1894, on November 11,
1896, a Convention related to Matters of Civil Procedure, i.e., to matters of inter-
national legal assistance, had been signed (later substantially revised at the Fourth
Conference in 1904 and, as revised, signed on July 17, 1905-not ratified or
adopted either by Great Britain, Russia, or the United States; but in operation
in 22 European countries) no progress has been made as to an international con-
vention concerning foreign judgments. The fifth and sixth Hague Conferences on
Private International Law in 1925 and 1928, respectively, dealt with the subject;
at the fifth Conference a draft Convention was voted for on November 7, 1925.
For the history of the draft see Wigmore, The Execution of Foreign Judgments:
A Study in the International Assimilation of Private Law, 21 ILL. L. REV. 1
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by taking account of that difference, some progress could be
made in the appreciation of both the usefulness of the applica-
tion of ideas of reciprocity to the performance of international
legal assistance and the worthlessness of such an application for
the approach of foreign judgments.
It is manifest that the performance of legal assistance abroad
is of primary importance for the State administering justice.
Government is intent on affording an efficient judicial and ad-
ministrative procedure as means of obtaining truth in cases to
be decided by its own tribunals through a method which is able
to overcome evidentiary difficulties in space without baffling
sacrifices in time and expenses. We can at any rate perceive the
fact that, because every State is greatly concerned in the proper
administration of justice, the State asking for legal assistance
is acting in the highest interest of its own.
The degree of that interest of a State varies with the extent
of its international economic interests. This might explain why,
even at present, despite the immense intensification of interna-
tional trade relations and the immense facilitation of trans-na-
tional travel, general international law has not yet evolved the
idea that non-compliance with a request for legal assistance con-
stitutes an international delinquency.
Consequently the compliance with a foreign tribunal's request
for international legal assistance is, in absence of a treaty,'4 a
matter of domestic law for the requested State. In general, the
manner in which the domestic law in this country has approached
and treated the subject leaves much to be desired.' 5 There is
(1926). A draft convention met with no success. See Merz, Die fuenfte Haager
Konferenz fuer internationales Privatrecht, in DRUCKSCHRIFT No. 19 DER SCHWEI-
ZER VEREINIGUNG FUER INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHIT (1927). At the seventh
Conference at The Hague, a resolution was passed, calling for new efforts to obtain
the ratification of the 1925/1928 draft convention. Cf. CONFi RENCE DE LA IIAYE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt, ACTES DE LA SEPTIPME SESSION 401 (1952).
14. According to the Report rendered at the International Bar Association
Meeting in Madrid 1952 by R. AGILABABIAN, LA COOPPRATION ET ASSISTANCE JUDI-
CIARE INTERNATIONALE (mimeo. 1952), there had been entered into from 1905-
1939 more than 125 bilateral Conventions on the subject. No international-
judicial-assistance agreement proper exists to which the United States is a party.
However, Consular treaties permitting United States Consular officers to take
depositions of American citizens only exist with 23 countries. Jones, International
Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J.
515, 523 (1953).
15. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION,
PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 47-50 (1950). See also H.R. 5061, later H.R. 7500 and S. 1597,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), bill to establish a Commission and Advisory Com-
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some legislation in several foreign countries providing for the
granting of international legal assistance. 16 Such legislation is
not to be found either in Germany or in France. Therefore, in
these Code States no legal command imposes a duty upon the do-
mestic tribunals to comply with a foreign court's request ex-
pressed in letters rogatory. 1 7
However, a warning against careless analysis seems to be
pertinent. The fact that the domestic law expressly provides for
international legal assistance has, from the standpoint of in-
ternational law, no more weight than the opposite, namely, the
absence of express legal norms. In case of an erroneous refusal
of assistance, the party aggrieved may appeal as in any other
case of a wrong interpretation of a norm of municipal law. This
has nothing to do with international law; for, since no rule of
general international law imposes a duty to grant such an as-
sistance, this kind of international cooperation, if carried out, is
viewed from the perspective of international law as a matter of
good will and civility, performed "4 titre de courtoisie interna-
tional," or as "comitas gentium."'5 Since the refusal of this
usage of "comity" seriously interferes with an important in-
terest of the requesting State, that is, the interest in its proper
administration of justice, such an absolute refusal will rarely
occur ;19 but, if it happens, it is regarded as an unfriendly 20 act
unless there are good reasons for the refusal, such as the in-
consistency of the request with leading principles of the pro-
cedural law of the requested State. By this token, the refusal,
for example, to comply with an American request for examining
a party as a witness, where such examination is not allowed
mittee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. The Commission is to investi-
gate and study existing practices of judicial assistance between the United States
and foreign countries, with a view to achieve improvements. The adjournment of
Congress prevented the final passage in the House, while action in the Senate
awaited the report from the House.
16. For example, Belgium: Act of June 18, 1869, art. 139; Italy: CODICE DI
PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 802; Austria: JURISDIKTIONSNORM (Statute on Jurisdic-
tion of the Courts) § 38 (1895); Czechoslovakia: ZPO (Civil Procedure Law)
§ 627 et seq. (1950) ; Yugoslavia: ZPO § 36 (1929).
17. RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECnT 674 (1949) ; MOREL,
TRAITf PLfMENTAIRE DE PROCItDURE CIVIL § 472 (2d ed. 1949).
18. The distinction between an international duty and a course of conduct sug-
gested only by international comity is well drawn in STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (3d ed. 1954).
19. Lutterloh, Zwischen8taatliche Recht8hilfe, in 4 HANDW6RTERBUCII DER
RECIITSWISSENSCIIAFT 680, 684 (1927).
20. Id. at 684; LESKE-LOENWENFELD, DIE RECnTsvERFOLGUNG IM INTERNA-
TIONALEN VERKE]IR 123, n. 35 (Magnus ed. 1930).
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procedurally by the requested State, must probably be regarded
as justified.
Turning to the possible reaction against an unjustified re-
fusal of judicial assistance, it might be recalled that the request
for such assistance issues from a government (and not, as in
the case of the enforcement of a foreign judgment, from a pri-
vate party). A government desirous of receiving such assist-
ance from another one, can hardly with any grace ask for it, if
it had previously shown some reluctance to be of service as to
an analogous request from its opposite number. This explains
the generally admitted fact that a request for legal assistance
has to be construed as containing the implied, if not the ex-
pressed, promise to adhere to reciprocity. 21 Where there are
treaties dealing with such assistance, a reciprocity feature has
always been included. Even where there is no treaty, the respect
paid to the mutual interest in obtaining judicial assistance may,
as we saw, be reflected in the reciprocal compliance with a pro-
cedure to that effect.22 If we ask what a State might do in the
event of an unjustified refusal of assistance by another State,
the answer is that the former may requite a bad treatment re-
ceived with an analogous treatment given the latter, that is, by
a measure of rntorsion. Thus, the regard or disregard given to
the interest of another State designates substantially the dividing
line between reciprocity and r~torsion.
III
This seems clear enough and may be helpful in discerning
the main sources of error which accounted for the confusion
permeating the Hilton v. Guyot decision.2 3 In that case the Su-
21. For the reciprocity problem in international legal assistance see Jones,
International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform,
62 YALE L.J. 515, 532 (1953).
22. As an illustration, such a reciprocal willingness to grant legal assistance,
in the absence of an agreement, exists between Germany and 31 countries, the
United States being included in this figure. See ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCHI DES
DEUTSCIIEN ZIVILPROZESSRECIfTS 73 (6th ed. 1954).
23. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The Court in a 5 to 4 decision refused to render a
judgment enforcing (i.e., granting conclusive effect to) a French money judgment
rendered against two Americans on a French cause of action, for the plaintiff, who
was the official liquidator of a French firm. The reason for the refusal was seen
in the fact that French law does not regard an American judgment as conclusive
evidence of the claim adjudicated therein in favor of the plaintiff. A French court
will not grant an emequatur before it is satisfied, inter alia, of the regularity of
the proceeding had in the foreign court and of the application by the latter of the
proper law. Cf. Perroud, Ddcisions judiciaires Otrangdres, in 5 REPERTOIRE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 351 (1929).
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preme Court made reciprocity a requirement for the full recog-
nition of the judgment of a foreign country by a federal court.
One may add that it has never been disputed that from the stand-
point of American constitutional law the question of whether,
and to what extent, weight ought to be given to a judgment of
a foreign country, falls within the authority of the states.24 What,
then, are the errors charged to the Hilton doctrine? In the first
place, the Court confused the international problem with the
rule of the domestic law, because the non-existence of an inter-
national duty does not affect the control of the situation by an
affirmative domestic rule. The question of the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment is, as we might recall,
always one of domestic law. Neither by the Anglo-American
common law25 nor by any federal or state provision26 does such
enforcement depend upon the reciprocal attitude of the State of
rendition in the obverse situation.
in the second place, it is still true that despite strong argu-
ments advanced to the contrary by one of the greatest among
the "Grotians, ' '27 Emerich de Vattel,28 the treatment of foreign
judgments is, aside from treaties, entirely a matter within the
legislative discretion of the different States. However, where
the municipal law such as the Anglo-American common law pro-
vides for the recognition and enforcement of foreign money
judgments without making reciprocity one of the requirements,
the granting of those effects to such a judgment is not a matter
24. For details, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial
Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 619, 762 (1954).
25. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 403 (6th ed., Morris 1949) : "The question of
giving effect to a foreign judgment is not at common law in any way dependent
on reciprocity of treatment."
Only in the most recent legislation, reciprocity is given some thought. See
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23 GEO. V, c. 13, § 1.
However, the question of direct enforceability after registration has, of course,
nothing to do with the question of recognition of a foreign judgment. The act
refers only to the former, not to the latter. See also Borm-Reid, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 3 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 49 (1954). _
26. The absence of a statutory provision -was admitted by Mr. Justice Gray,
who expressed only his doubts whether a statute, if enacted, would dispense with
a reciprocity feature.
27. The name designates that classical school of international law which stanas
midway between the "naturalists" who attempted to derive the concepts of that
law from the "law of nature," and the "positivists," who pushed positive law to
the fore at the expense of the natural law. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
94 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948).
28. in 2 DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE
APPLIQUItS A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS c. 7,§ 85 (1758) [reprinted in 1 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (1916)1. He
thought that each decision rendered by a court within the limits of its jurisdiction
should be given recognition everywhere.
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of comity on the part of the court in the forum, but a matter of
duty imposed by a command of municipal law. Ergo, the whole
talk in the Hilton opinion about "the comity of our nation not
requiring us to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the
courts of France" was from the standpoint of legal analysis
absolutely wrong. Brief as the dissenting opinion delivered by
Chief Justice Fuller is, the correct view to be taken of the
matter is expressed in one remarkably accurate and lucid passage
of his:
"The application of the doctrine of res judicata [regarding
the French judgment] does not rest in discretion; and it is
for the government, and not for its courts, to adopt the prin-
ciple of retorsion, if deemed under any circumstances de-
sirable or necessary.
'
"2
To mention the question of the desirability or necessity for
retaliatory measures against a State because its municipal law
does not grant conclusive (res judicata) effect to a foreign judg-
ment means to direct attention to a third erroneous assumption
underlying Hilton v. Guyot. Our previous analysis has led us
to the conclusion that the treatment of a judgment abroad is
not a matter in which the judicial administration of the State
of rendition has a reasonable interest as is the case with the
assistance by the foreign judiciary to the smooth and complete
disposition of a pending controversy. As it will be seen, the
insistence of a State on reciprocity regarding the treatment of
judgments rendered by its courts, may have its roots in con-
siderations of prestige; but it is not true that, in general, the
reason must be found in the natural interest of a State in the
protection of rights acquired by its nationals. If such were the
case, the German courts, for example, would enforce an Ameri-
can judgment rendered in favor of a German party; but they
deny the enforcement regardless of the nationality of the vic-
torious party 0 Conversely, it is highly improbable that the
judgment-state has any interest in seeing a judgment rendered
by its own court for an alien, and against its national, enforced
in the former's country at the expense of the latter's economic
existence there. On the contrary, there is every reason to be-
lieve that the judgment-state would have the opposite interest.
29. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (dissenting opinion) (1895).
30. Germany: ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (Code of Civil Procedure) § 328; cf.
especially Siiss, Die Anerkennung auslaendischer Urteile, in BEITRAEGE ZUMI ZIVIL-
PROZESSRECHT (FESTGABE FtR LEO ROSENBERG) 229, 236 (1949).
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The truth of this observation has been so intelligible that, despite
the inspirational power which ordinarily important decisions of
the Supreme Court exercise upon the courts in the sister states,
such was not the case with the Hilton decision. Only a very few
state courts have adopted its doctrine, and New York, Massa-
chusetts, Illinois, and California - states before the courts of
which most of the cases involving foreign judgments have been
brought - have not joined the minority.31
The subject of this study does not extend to a further discus-
sion of the Hilton case, particularly of its range.3 2 The imprint
of the case was a new one upon the law of this country because
it was, as we saw, a break with the common law and its tradi-
tion. However, the majority opinion could refer to parallel re-
quirements in the law of many foreign countries.33 The follow-
ing attempt to inquire how it happened that the idea of reci-
procity forced its entrance into the area of municipal law under
discussion might have its significance at present for bringing
to the fore the esential considerations to guide our legislative
policy in an era of closest international connection.
IV
Historically speaking, the role of reciprocity in the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments is a modern creation.
Understandably, we find, within the field of public international
law, very early reciprocal treaties as those concerning extradi-
tion of felons34 and others dealing with protection and commer-
cial advantages for merchants.3 5
31. For this minority see Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147
Atl. 715 (1929); Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735
(1920). See also In re Vanderborght, 91 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio 1950). All the other
states have ignored the Tiilton philosophy an so did RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 433 (1934). See also Johnston v. Compagnie G~ngrale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
32. For a discussion on this and other related questions see Lenhoff, Reci-
procity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 619, 760-63
(1954).
33. For a list of countries whose law has accepted the postulate of reciprocity
for the enforceability of foreign judgments, see von Simson. Prozesswirkungen im
internationalen Privatrecht, in 4 REC]ITSVERGLEICHIENDES 1IANDtW5TERBUCH FtR
DAS ZIVIL-UND HANDELSRECIT 536 (1933) ; see also Siiss, Die Anerkennung
auslaendischer Urteile, in BEITRAEGE ZUM ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (FESTGABE FfJR LEO
ROSENBERO) 229, 248 (1949).
34. Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function: A Problem of Conflict of Laws, Consti-
tutional Law and International Law, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 44, 45, n. 6 (1953).
35. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 30 (1947).
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We meet with reciprocity features in a few matters of pri-
vate international law as early as in the twelfth century. Neu-
mayer called attention to a statute of Como of 1219 which di-
rected the magistrates to apply to aliens the same law as to
citizens, that is, the lex fori.36 This attitude was in line with the
legal climate of the time. In the first stage of the medieval
Italian judicial practice (in the eleventh and twelfth centuries)
the courts decided in conflict cases according to the lex fori.87
However, a discriminatory treatment against a Comonese in an-
other city would lead the tribunals in Como to retaliate against
a citizen of that city.38 It seems that from the beginning of the
thirteenth century the concept of the control of the lex fori was
losing ground. For the choice of law more weight came to be
given to that which the particular posture of the case required.39
However, the reciprocity idea in form of rdtorsion was not elimi-
nated as to choice-of-law determinations. It is too well known
to call for more than a reference that the glossators and post-
glossators had traced problems of the conflict of laws back to
a passage of the Corpus Iuris Justinianei.40 But those great
scholars found therein also a sentence 41 on which they could
build up, in terms of r6torsion, a theory of reciprocity for the
private law of aliens, particularly in the law of succession.42
Treaties establishing the principle of national treatment are re-
ported as of such an early date as the thirteenth century.48
36. 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICIE ENTWIC.ELUNG DES INTERNATION-
ALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHTS BIS BARTOLUS 18 (1916).
37. Id. at 13-20, 144 et seq.
38. Id. at 18. In the treaty between Venice and Genoa of 1218-1228 there
also was a clause providing for rdtorsion. Id. at 19.
39. 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECIITLICIIE ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATION-
ALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHITS BIs BARTOLUS 75 et seq. (1916). See also Yntema,
The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 297, 302
(1953).
40. In the first words of the third part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, that is, the
Codex Justinianeus (1.1.1), the basis was found for the principle that the court
of the forum is not bound by a foreign rule. The first words are: Cunctos populos
quos clementia nostrae regit imperium" (as the Glossators read the last word).
This pointed to the thought that there are limits set to the ruling of the law of a
State. Gutzwiller, Internationales Privatrecht, in 1 STAMmLEE, DAB GESAMTE
DEUTSCHE REcHIT 1522 (1931) ; Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private Interna-
tional Law, 2 AM. J. Comp. L. 297, 302 (1953).
41. DIGEST 2.2.1.1. For the history, see the admirable study, Rapisardi-Mira-
belli, La R1torsion- Etude de droit international, 16 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL ET DE LtOISLATION COMPARitE 223, 232 et seq. (1914).
42. Thus, later on, STRYK, SPECIMEN UBUS MODERNI PANDECTARUm 207 (6th
ed. 1927) quoted: "Quod quisque iuris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem utatur."
43. Cf. 2 NEUMEYER, DIE OEMEINRECHTLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNA-
TIONALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHTS BIS BARTOLUS 19 (1916) ; BRISSAUD, A HIS-
TORY OP FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 873 (Howell transl. 1912).
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It seems that relevancy of reciprocity for the questions of
the enforcement, and even of merely the recognition of foreign
judgments is a notion which was conceived much later. What is
the explanation of this posteriority in point of time? May this
fact not also make us apprehend why neither the English com-
mon law nor the medieval Continental-Roman common law had
included a reciprocity concept in their dealing with foreign judg-
ments? We might gain some insight into this historical phe-
nomenon when we remind ourselves of a few legal-historical
facts:
At the time when in the medieval Italian law schools the
first roots of private international law were laid, the state-units in
question were, from the standpoint of the then constitutional law
and political philosophy, political divisions, cities endowed with
substantial autonomy, within the only State, the Holy Roman
Empire. The statuta were, therefore, local rules of customary
nature within the realm of the imperial law, the Roman law. 44
Public instruments executed in another city or province than
that of the forum were granted full faith and credit,45 and as
within any other political unit so was, within the conceptual
unit embracing the Italian cities, judicial and administrative
assistance given by the tribunals of one community to those of
the other .4  Thus, it was entirely in line with the whole legal
picture that courts in one city attributed to a rendered judgment
the effect of res judicata as between the same parties and the
same issue (eadem quaestio), aside from the fact that its con-
clusive effect derived from its legal nature as a public docu-
44. 1 GOLDSCHMIDT, UNIVERSALOESCHICHTE DES HANDELSRECHTS 101 et seq.
(1891); Gutzwiller, Internationales Privatrecht, in STAMMLER, DAs GESAMTE
DEUTSCHE RECUT 1523 (1930): "The whole Christian World was, in the legal
view, the territory of the medieval Empire governed by the Roman-common law."
2 STINTZING-LANDSBERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCIIAFT 6
et 8eq. (1884).
45. See the passage in the compilation of Accursius called Summa Authentic-
orum (ascribed to Azo), Coll. 6, tit. 3, No. 2 (de instrumentorum editione et fide
-- Nov. 73) in Krcmsdr, Beitraege zur Geschichte des Internationalen Privatrechtes,
in 2 FESTSCHRIFT ZUR JARHUINDERTFEIER DES ALLGEMEINEN BUERGERLICHEN
uESETZBUCirS 133, 146 (1.911), and in 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICIIE
I1NTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHTS BIS BARTOLUB
52, 103 (1916).
16. Where a national had abroad assumed obligations contained in a iorelgu
instrument, some limitations are placed upon the evidentiary effect of the instru-
ment; but in general, private legal instruments had been granted recognition.
2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECJITLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHTS BIS BARTOLUS 52 (1916).
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ment.47 Obviously, this recognition was not conditioned upon the
observance of reciprocity.
V
The requirement of reciprocity for the recognition of for-
eign judgments emerged later. On the one hand, a feeling that
the authority of the Emperor was a foreign one had not yet
developed; on the other hand, the ideology underlying the whole
concept of the Empire was a cosmopolitan one, that of a "world
law" corresponding to the "one-world idea" of the medieval
spirit.4
The emergence of the idea of sovereignty followed the world-
historical process of the transformation of vassals 'into inde-
pendent rulers, or, what is only another formulation, of feudal
seigniories into States, by the splitting up of the Empire. 49 The
development necessarily was to have its impact. upon private
international law. Along with the idea of sovereignty strong
national feelings evolved :50 Since acts of one State cannot op-
erate ex proprio vigore within the territory of another state,
with the latter claiming its sovereignty like the former, it was
regarded as a matter of comitas to grant those acts, whatever
they might be, laws or decisions alike, recognition. And a State
proceeds "ex comitate," if and when its courteous attitude is
reciprocated. 51 Thus the motive of self-interest replaced the
motive of doing justice which had inspired the formative era
of private international law.52 The door was opened for letting
47. Id. at 53, 55, 103.
48. Words used by Krcmdr, Beitraege zur Geschichte des Internationalen
Privatrechtes, in 2 FESTSCHRIFT ZUR JAIIRHUNDERTFEIER DES ALLGEMEINEN
BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS 154, 156 (1911). See also the magnificent work
of KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS ROEMISCHE RECIT (1947) (passim).
49. For the creator of the theory of sovereignty, Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and
his work [LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1576)], see 2 STINTZING-LANDS-
BERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 34 et seq. (1884).
50. The idea of the "one" law (Roman law) in one world has been shaken.
Now, the application of Roman law was explained with a voluntary reception,
and not with the supreme legislative power of the emperor. This was particularly
the argument of Hermann Conring (1606-1681) -called "the father of German
legal history" - in his work, De origine iuris Germanici in 1643. 2 STINTZING-
LANDSBERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 173 et seq.
(1884).
51. See, e.g., STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 24 (7th ed.
1872).
52. Of. Meili, Ueber das historische Debut der Doktrin des internationalen
Privat-und Strafrechts, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT-UND STRA-
FRECHT (B6HM'S ZEITSCHRIFT) 1, 10 et seq. (1899).
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in reciprocity as a requisite for the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments even prior to the beginning of the last century.53 However,
reciprocity, as an almost standing feature in the law of a great
many foreign States dealing with foreign judgments, bears the
nineteenth-century mark.
The "Naturalists" and the "Grotians" 54 of the late seven-
teenth and of the eighteenth century had already preached the
gospel that no sovereign is under an obligation from the stand-
point of the law of nature to carry out acts of another sov-
ereign. 5  This doctrine had, of course, its roots in the ideas of
territoriality and sovereignty which had evolved on the Con-
tinent during the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth
century, ideas which found their "pendant" in the nineteenth-
century protectionism and nationalism. 56
The Continental doctrines which had indoctrinated the
Americans Story and Wheaton, on whose books5" the majority
opinion in Hilton v. Guyot relied so heavily, were of pre-nine-
teenth century vintage such as those of Grotius, the two Voet,
Ulrich Huber and Vattel, to mention the main sources. Mr. Jus-
tice Gray, unaware of the spirit of Nationalism as the founding
father of the reciprocity features of the foreign laws to which
he referred, would have protested that his nice distinctions58
53. See the Boundary Treaty between France and Sardinia of March 24, 1760,
stating that for the purpose of facilitating the reciprocal execution of judgments
and orders, the highest court of one of the High Contracting Parties shall make
these decisions of the other Party to be executed. See also the Austrian laws
(Hofdekrete) of May 18, 1792, JGS No. 16, and February 15, 1805, JGS No. 711,
concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments. Cf. Wittmaack, Kann ein Voll-
8treckungsurteil nach 722 und 723 ZPO auf Grund eines nordamerikanischen,
insbesondere kaliforni8chen Urteil8 erla8sen werden?, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTER-
NATIONALES RECHT (NIEMEYER'S ZEITSCHRIFT) 1 at 8eq. (1912). The fact that
only since the beginning of the nineteenth century a few German States has
inserted a reciprocity feature into their laws concerning foreign judgments can
also be seen from MITTERMAIER, VON DER VOLLSTRECKUNG EINES VON EINEM
AUSLANDISCHEN GERICTITE GEFXLLTEN URTHEILS, 14 ARCHuIV Ft R DIE CIVILISTISCHE
PRAXIS 84 et seq. (1831).
54. For these doctrines of international law, see note 27 8upra.
55. For details, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal A8pect of a Perennial
Idea, 49 Nw. U.L.REv. 619, 752-73 (1954). ,
56. See the excellent book, ERNST, GEGENSEITIGKEIT UND VERGELTUNG Im
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 94 et 8eq. (dissertation 1950).
57. Mr. Justice Gray drew particularly on STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 615-18 (7th ed. 1874) ; and on WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 78, 79 (Dana ed. 1866).
58. I think of the dividing line drawn in the opinion between a course which
involves international obligations arising em proprio vigore or ex debito iustitiae,
and another course which may be taken only em comitate. The weakness of this
basis as far as the question of foreign judgments was concerned is discussed else-
where in this paper.
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appeared in a different light in 1895, from that which inspired
their expounders such as Ulrich Huber and Vattel.
The historical link between eighteenth century sovereignty
and nineteenth century nationalism is the imperialism of Na-
poleon Bonaparte. He used the appeal to nationalistic instincts as
a means of creating new national states at the expense of the old
empires. Upon his request the principle of national treatment of
aliens, pronounced in the draft of the Civil Code, had been
qualified by conditioning its operation on the existence of a
treaty.59 When, a few years later, the noted draftsman of the
Austrian Civil Code, Franz von Zeiller, wrote the first Com-
mentaries on this legislation, he remarked that, in the "Tri-
bunat,"6 0 Napoleon had argued that "without such a qualifica-
tion the French legislation would become subject to the legisla-
tion of foreign States." 61
No better illustration for the change from the eighteenth
century spirit to the nationalistic harshness can be found than
a comparison between the treatment of alien residents in a
country when a war arises between it and their home country,
as provided for in the American-Prussian Treaty of 1785 on the
one hand, and Napoleon's action in 1803 on the other. Accord-
ing to that treaty, inspired by the young United States, aliens
were "allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and
settle their affairs and they were further allowed to depart
freely with their effects without molestation or hindrance. 6 2
By contrast Napoleon decreed on May 23, 1803, that all British
civilians in France between the ages of 18 and 60 should be
interned. 3
The movements for political unifications, such as those in
Germany and Italy during a large part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, were nationalistic. However, nationalism had not only its
impact upon the political map, but also upon legal ideology and
policy.
59. See CODE CIVIL art. 11 (France 1804).
60. A legislative body which consisted of 100 members appointed by the Senate
from panels submitted by the ddpartements. All this reflects the success of Na-
poleon's coup d'etat.
61. VON ZEILLER, COMMENTAR taER DAS BORGERLICHE GESETZBUCH 144
(1811).
62. Treaty of Amity and Commerce of September 10, 1785, art. 23. See 2
MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS 1477 (1910).
63. 1 TIERS, HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE 496, libre 17 (German
ed. 1846) ; CHATEAUBRIAND, NAPOLEON 85 (ed. 1920).
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One need only read the committee report of the German Diet
concerning the draft of what was to become the German Code of
Civil Procedure of 1877. Honor and dignity of the new German
Reich, the majority believed, called for the insertion of a reci-
procity feature.0 4 But it is characteristic that the same German
Code of Civil Procedure has not established reciprocity as a
prerequisite for the executability of foreign private arbitration
awards 5 Here, again, we have a good example of the illogical
use of the sovereignty idea in private international law. Foreign
awards rendered by private arbitrators or arbitration boards
are not regarded as acts of State. Ergo, the awards present a
conclusive settlement of the matter barring the State in which
they were rendered as well as the forum in which their enforce-
ment is sought from retrying the facts.60 An analogue can be
found in the distinction drawn by American courts with respect
to the enforceability of a deed concerning land abroad between
its execution by an appointee of the court on the one hand, and
by the party on the other. If executed by the former, it will
not be enforced abroad, while a private deed is given the full
effect of passing title, although the party acted under the com-
pulsion of the decree.6 7
The nationalistic trend towards the demand for reciprocity
in the matter of foreign-court judgments can be seen in three
ways. The first way has been followed by the native country of
Grotius and Huber. The Netherlands has not changed its atti-
tude of refusing the enforcement of foreign judgments 68 - aside
64. Of. Klein, Das Erfordernis der verbuergten Gegenseitigkeit bei Voll-
streckung auslaendischer Urteile in Deutschland, 6 ZEITSCnRIFT FfIR INTERNA-
TIONALES PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECILT (BOI1M's ZEITSCuRIFT) 97, 99 (1896). It
might be interesting to note that the Prussian draft of 1863-prior to the wars
of 1866 and 1870-following the Prussian General Judicial Ordinance (1793)
did not contain a reciprocity angle. However, during the first half of the nine-
teenth century the courts had read it into the law. And the Report on the draft
expressed "the hope," that the courts would also in the future follow the practice
to deny enforcement where the foreign-judgment state does not grant it. "Motives"
(to the draft) 247, quoted by Wittmaack, Kann cin Vollstreckungsurteil nach
722 und 723 ZPO auf Grund eines nordamericakischen, insbesondere kaliforni-
schen Urteils erlassen woerden?, in 22 NIEMEYER'S ZEITSCHRIFT 1, 9 (1912).
65. Germany: ZPO § 1944; ROSENRERO, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVIL-
PROZESSRECHTS 820 et 8eq. (6th ed. 1954).
66. Cf. ERNST, GEGENSEITIGKEIT UND VERGELTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN PRI-
VATRECHT 95 (1950) ; WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (2d ed. 1950).
67. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
68. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Regtvordering art. 431; JITTA, INTERNATIONAAL
PRIVAATRECHT 170 (1916).
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from a few exceptions in admiralty law - enforcement, however,
being distinguished from recognition.6 9
Illustrations for the second approach are supplied by those
countries which require the observation of reciprocity even for
a mere recognition of a foreign judgment in personam, so that
such a judgment lacks conclusive effect. Illustrative is the law
of Denmark,70 Spain,71 Germany, 72 and Austria.73
The third group is represented by the Italian law. Originally,
the law required no more than a declaration of executability by
the court in the forum - a so-called giudizio di delibazione which
was to be granted upon the compliance with the generally stated
requirements, none of which referred to reciprocity.7 4 Only later,
modifications, particularly those enacted during the era of
fascism, changed the picture profoundly,7 a process which has
properly been termed one of nationalistic protectionism in the
field of law.70 It seems that the present Code 77 has returned to
traditional Italian liberalism - but the question, whether recip-
rocity is eliminated, is disputed.7 8
69. Not only the Netherlands make such a distinction, but even many countries
in which reciprocity is a requisite. However, this distinction has no basis in
the law of the United States (federal jurisdiction) or in Germany (with some
qualification for matrimonial judgments) and Austria. See WOLFF, PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 254 (2d ed. 1950). His proper formulation: "Only in the
countries in which enforcement depends on reciprocity can a doubt arise whether
mere recognition, and in particular, the effect of res judicata, are conditioned by
reciprocity."
70. Denmark: Civil Procedure Act of May 19, 1909, as amended, Act of May
10, 1932, §§ 223a, 479: Recognition upon condition of reciprocity established by
treaties failing which recognition may be had where royal order expresses the
existence of reciprocity with the foreign country. Execution in either case calls
for a court decree.
71. Spain: LEY DE ENJUICAMIENTO CIVIL (Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 952,
953 (1881). In absence of a treaty, the principle of material reciprocity controls,
i.e., a judgment has the same effect as a Spanish judgment has in the judgment
State. See also ERNST, GEGENSEITIGKEIT UND VERGELTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHT 118 et seq. (1950).
72. Germany: ZPO § 328 as for judgments on rights which relate to money
or money's value.
73. Austria: EXEKUTIONSORDNUNG (Act concerning executions) § 79. Of.
RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 525 (1949).
74. Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 10 of the Preliminary Title (1865) ; CODICE DI
PROCEDURA CIVILE arts. 941-950 (1865).
75. DECRETO-LEGGE of July 20, 1919, and particularly the act of May 28,
1925.
76. ERNST, GEGENSEITIGKEIT UND VERGELTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
RECHT 99 (1950), with reference to the fact that representative Italian interna-
tionalists as Diena felt that with so many other countries having, in spite of
Italy's liberal attitude, enacted the reciprocity requirement, Italy had been
"cheated" and was, therefore, forced to change its attitude.
77. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 797 (1940), as amended, law of July 14,
1950, No. 581.
78. The provision of article 797 of the new Codice enumerates all the require-
ments for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and reciprocity is not one of
them. But it is a prerequisite for the recognition of the competence of the foreign
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At this date, France's legal system does not include a reci-
procity feature; but article 105 of the draft of a revised Code
provides that no exequatur for an execution shall be granted
where the judgment in question comes from a foreign country
in which French decisions cannot form the basis for execution.79
VI
The influence of nationalistic emotionalism is, as the history
of the last century and of more than a half of this century
proves, hard to break. That the task to break it is a hard one
can be seen from the topic discussed in the preceding section.
The legal experts have been fully aware of the errors under-
lying the postulate of reciprocity concerning the treatment of
foreign judgments. They have also referred to the great fallacy
which lies in the belief that the interests of a nonresident na-
tional are advanced by a policy which is averse to such an en-
forcement of a judgment only because it is a foreign one. It has
been properly pointed out that the insistence on reciprocity serves
only to mislead the forum by diverting its attention from the
real question, that is, the question of whether the judgment
shows that the particular national had become the victim of
serious injustice.80
Courts dealing with a case concerning a foreign judgment
have always felt it their duty to give consideration to the ques-
tion whether the way in which the judgment was obtained had
been in accordance with procedural fair play and natural justice.
Thus, strong safeguards prevent a questionable foreign decision
from obtaining the quality of conclusiveness.81
Concerning the question of whether reciprocity is able to
supply such a safeguard, it will be sufficient to call attention to
an important point. There are States whose administration of
justice might, to use a mild expression, not be regarded as a
model of perfection. However, by compliance with the reci-
court, article 4(4), which in turn is one of the requirements for the enforcement
of the judgment. On the controversial relation of article 797 to article 4(4), see
mORELLI, DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE 322 et seq. (1954).
79. For details, see Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments, 65
=ARv. L. REV. 1184 (1952).
80. Reese, 'The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 783, 793 (1950).
81. Lenhoff, Die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung auslaendischer Urteile in
U.S.A., 19 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
201, 224 (1954).
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procity requirement they may secure for their judgments the
preferred status in a country which is outstanding for the high
degree of judicial administration.82
From the preceding description of the relatively recent rise
of the reciprocity feature in the law of foreign judgments it
must be apparent that the difference in the place of reciprocity
between international judicial assistance and the treatment of
foreign judgments is momentous. In the present circumstances
in which the international community of States lacks a legal
machinery of its own, the observance of reciprocity is the alterna-
tive for an adequate administration of justice in cases requiring
service of a papers and taking of evidence abroad. Manifestly
this is only one instance of the all-pervasiveness of reciprocity
which is visible in each and every aspect of international law.
Unfortunately, it has not yet been fully realized that with
regard to the question of which effect should be given a foreign
judgment neither a problem of international law nor one of a
policy involving national dignity confronts the forum. The re-
quirements of reciprocity is, from the standpoint of juristic logic,
an arbitrary and, from the standpoint of legal policy, an un-
desirable one.
82. Siiss, Die Anerkennung auslaendischer Urteile, in BEITRAEGE ZUM ZIVIL-
PROZESSRECHT (FESTGABE FYJR LEO ROSENBERG) 229 (1949) ; Schima, The 'resent
Statue of International Procedural Law, 73 JURISTISCHE BLXTTER 522, 524
(1951).
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